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Re: [lisp-interest] LISP-ALT and security



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On Jul 30, 2008, at 3:56 PM, Erik Nordmark wrote:

Vince Fuller wrote:
That was what I was suggesting in my previous email, you can issue signed material (similar to ROAs for ASNs) using RPKI certs that ties the prefixes allocated from RIRs to the RLOCs you select. The issue here is if this is an off-line or on-line (inside lisp??) exchange.
You need to approach it from the EID and not from the RLOC; show that the ETR can speak for the EID prefix. Hence with a PKI approach you´d need to build a certificate infrastrure based on the delegation of the EID prefixes.
If EID assignment is rooted at the RIRs and if the RIRs participate in the authorization system (which one might imagine that must for the "normal",
BGP-based global routing system to work), then this should fall out
naturally.

OK. Who would verify the map-reply? The ITR might not run BGP AFAIU.

Yes, it should be the ITR, in that scenario it would have to check a signature in the map-reply but no need for BGP but yes it means a crypto check an subsequent delay on filling the mapping cache.



One way would be to send the map-reply back via the ALT BGP speakers so they they can verify it (akin to how they would verify a routing update). Were you to do that then current filter technology could be applied to the map-replies as well.


Yes I can see that as an option.
r.


Without something like that I don´t see how the prefix length in the map-reply can be verified.

  Erik

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